In a classic problem of sequential information acquisition, a Bayesian decision-maker (DM) repeatedly acquires information and takes actions. His payoff depends on the sequence of actions taken, as well as on an unknown payoff-relevant state. We consider a setting in which the DM acquires information from a limited number of flexibly correlated information sources, and allocates a fixed number of observations across these sources each period. We assume that it is possible to learn the payoff-relevant state by observing all of the sources infinitely often, but not by observing any proper subset of sources (information is "not redundant"). The optimal strategy for information acquisition is of interest.
functions (and in particular, independently of discounting); thus, myopic information acquisition is (eventually) "robustly" best.
Why does the myopic rule perform so well? The main inefficiency of myopia is that it neglects potential complementarities across signals. A signal that is individually uninformative can be very informative when paired with other signals; thus, repeated (greedy) acquisition of the best single signal need not result in the best sequence of signals. A key observation is that whether the DM perceives two signals as providing complementary information depends on his current belief over the state space. This means that complementarities across signals are not intrinsic to the underlying signal correlation structure: As the DM's beliefs about the states evolve, so too do his perceptions of the correlations across signals. It is clear that as information accumulates, the DM's beliefs become more precise about each of the unknown states. This does not itself lead to optimality of myopic information acquisition. We show that the key force comes from a second effect of information accumulation: The DM's beliefs evolve in such a way that the signals endogenously de-correlate from his perspective, and are eventually perceived as providing approximately independent information. At the limit in which all signals are independent, the value of any given signal can be evaluated separately of the others. The dynamic problem is thus "separable," and can be replaced with a sequence of static problems. Given sufficiently many signal observations, we have only approximate separability, which we show is sufficient for the myopic rule to be optimal.
The mechanism we identify is different from the one underlying a classic result from the experimentation literature. In "learning by experimentation" settings, myopic behavior is eventually near-optimal: in the long run, the DM's beliefs converge, so the value of exploration (i.e. learning) becomes second-order relative to the value of exploitation of the perceived best arm. In our paper, signal acquisition decisions are driven by learning concerns exclusively, as there is by design no exploitation incentive. To see this, recall that in the classic multi-armed bandit problem [1, 2] , actions play the dual role of influencing the evolution of beliefs and also determining flow payoffs. In our setting (which does not fall into the multi-armed bandit framework), there is a separation between signal choices, which influence the evolution of beliefs, and actions, which determine (unobserved) payoffs. Myopic signal choices become optimal in our framework because they maximize the speed of learning, and not because they optimize a tradeoff between learning and payoff.
We extend our results to a multi-player setting in which individuals privately acquire information before playing a one-shot game at a random final period (thus connecting to a literature on games with Gaussian information [3] [4] [5] ). We also demonstrate extensions to environments with choice of information "intensity" (the number of signals to acquire each period), to multiple payoff-relevant states (for a class of prediction problems) and to a continuous-time setting.
